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The purpose of this paper is to examine the lessons from the recent history of 
telecoms deregulation for the electricity (and by implication heat) network regulation. 
We do this in the context of Ofgem’s RPI-X@20 review of energy regulation in the 
UK, which considers whether RPI-X based price regulation is fit for purpose after 
over 20 years of operation in energy networks. We examine the deregulation of fixed 
line telecoms in the UK and the lessons which it seems to suggest. We then apply 
the lessons to electricity networks in the context of a possible increase in distributed 
generation directly connected to local distribution networks. We conclude that there 
is the possibility of more parallels over time and suggest several implications of this 
for the regulation of electricity and heat networks. 
 
The major lesson for energy networks from telecoms is that competition and 
innovation should go hand in hand in network industries. Where major innovation is 
possible and desirable, price regulation of incumbent monopolies is likely to be a 
barrier to new entry. If we are to take some of the more radical scenarios for 
the future of the electricity (and heat) sectors seriously, there is no doubt that major 
innovation both in terms of the application of technology and in terms of the 
organisation of the energy sector is essential. It is here above all that the lessons 
from telecoms are salient.  
 
If a world of micro-grids and energy service companies (and actively managed 
distribution network operators (DNOs)) is to emerge it will have to do so in a way 
which challenges the current business model of distribution network 
operators. No doubt innovative DNOs will be able to adapt to such a 




































the provision of network services and / or further unbundling and erosion of their 
natural monopoly.  
 
Telecoms provides two clear models of how this might proceed: via facilities based 
competition (based on actual or potential bypass of incumbent networks) or 
unbundled local access (via local loop unbundling).  Telecoms experience also 
strongly suggests the link between effective competition and the improvement in 
performance of the incumbent, who may retain a significant market share but only at 
the cost of substantial innovation, implying that there are substantial net benefits 
from apparently inefficient network asset duplication. 
 
There would appear to be no obvious technical barriers to this happening over time 
in electricity:  only economic and regulatory barriers (which may be quite rational). 
What society should strive for is a situation where fundamental economics 
determines whether or not these radical electricity futures emerge and not the inertia 
of incumbents or the existing regulatory system. Telecoms in the UK provides a case 
history of the resistance of the incumbent to change in face of what would seem be 
greater technological barriers than in electricity and heat. There would also seem to 
be lessons about the role of the regulator in deciding what form deregulation should 
take and the speed at which it should proceed. 
 
The lessons from telecoms remain tempered by the fact that electricity and heat 
networks develop more slowly than those in telecoms and the assets are longer 
lived. The role of climate change targets and incentives are also crucial in 
underpinning any future evolution of the energy sector. Information about how 
localised energy network competition based on new entrants might work has a high 
value in the near term. What would be sensible are some major experiments in 
promoting energy service companies and micro-grids to assess their ability to deliver 
climate change targets and their cost effectiveness. This might involve 
experimentation with fuller network charge deregulation/reregulation along the lines 
suggested in the paper in particular localities. It also remains important to ensure 
that regulation does not close off more radical future network scenarios too early 
before they have the chance to be examined. 
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  2003 (July)  2004 (July)  2005 (October)  July (2007) 
DSL, of which  12.5  22.5  40.8  56.4 
Incumbent  9.6  15.6  24.3  31.4 
Non‐incumbent  2.8  6.9  16.5  25.0 
Based on:         
Resale  1.5  2.3  4.9  9.1 
Bitstream  0.7  2.4  4.6  3.9 
LLU 
 
0.7  2.2  6.9  12.0 
Cable  4.1  5.6  8.2  10.1 
Other 
Technologies 
0.9  0.7  1.1  1.3 





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































                                                                                                                                                                     
2003/54/EC (and which the UK’s 2001 Electricity Supply Exemption Order complies with). See Ofgem (2009c, 
pp.11‐12).This is not a theoretical problem but might pose additional transaction costs on small companies. 
31 See DIUS (2009a, p.10, 16), sectors 8 and 16. 
32 See DIUS (2009b, p.6). 
33 See DIUS (2009b, p.6). 
34 See DIUS (2009a, p.116, 126), sectors 8 and 16. 
35 Ofgem (2008b) discusses the issues around increasing the IFI under DPCR5. 
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electricity and gas sectors, particularly as regards to final customer demand for innovation. It is also 
the case that telecoms itself still has some major debates raging about how best to regulate / 
deregulate the sector and how to incentivise next generation networks. 
The major lesson for energy networks from telecoms is that competition and innovation should go 
hand in hand in network industries. Where major innovation is possible and desirable, price 
regulation of incumbent monopolies is likely to be a barrier to new entry. If we are to take some of 
the more radical LENS scenarios for the future of the electricity (and heat) sectors seriously, there is 
no doubt that major innovation both in terms of the application of technology and in terms of the 
organisation of the energy sector is essential. It is here above all that the lessons from telecoms are 
salient.  
If a world of micro-grids and energy service companies (and actively managed DNOs) is to emerge it 
will have to do so in a way which challenges the current business model of distribution network 
operators. No doubt innovative DNOs will be able to adapt to such a world, but all will have to face 
the threat of intensifying competition for the provision of network services and / or further 
unbundling and erosion of their natural monopoly. Telecoms provides two clear models of how this 
might proceed: via facilities based competition (based on actual or potential bypass of incumbent 
networks) or unbundled local access (via local loop unbundling).  Telecoms experience also strongly 
suggests the link between effective competition and the improvement in performance of the 
incumbent, who may retain a significant market share but only at the cost of substantial innovation, 
implying that there are substantial net benefits from apparently inefficient network asset 
duplication. 
There would appear to be no obvious technical barriers to this happening over time in electricity:  
only economic and regulatory barriers (which may be quite rational). What society should strive for 
is a situation where fundamental economics determines whether or not these radical electricity 
futures emerge and not the inertia of incumbents or the existing regulatory system. Telecoms in the 
UK provides a case history of the resistance of the incumbent to change in face of what would seem 
be greater technological barriers than in electricity and heat. There would also seem to be lessons 
about the role of the regulator in deciding what form deregulation should take and the speed at 
which it should proceed. 
The lessons from telecoms remain tempered by the fact that electricity and heat networks develop 
more slowly than those in telecoms and the assets are longer lived. The role of climate change 
targets and incentives are also crucial in underpinning any future evolution of the energy sector. 
Information about how localised energy network competition based on new entrants might work 
has a high value in the near term. What would be sensible are some major experiments in promoting 
energy service companies and micro‐grids to assess their ability to deliver climate change targets 
and their cost effectiveness. This might involve experimentation with fuller network charge 
deregulation/reregulation along the lines suggested above in particular localities. It also remains 
important to ensure that regulation does not close off more radical future network scenarios too 
early before they have the chance to be examined. 
In closing, we suggest a number of factors that would bring a world of deregulated energy network 
charges closer: 
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1. Reduced share of distribution charges in total energy bills. Rising wholesale energy prices 
(due to a combination of high commodity prices, high carbon prices and high 
transmission/balancing services costs), would reduce the distribution network component of 
final energy prices, making network charge regulation less material and hence the threat of 
facilities based competition in networks more credible. 
 
2. Technological innovation which engages final customers. Technological innovation on both 
the generation and demand side would facilitate the growth of direct sales to final 
customers of energy saving equipment and/or the emergence of energy service companies, 
micro‐grids or more active distribution network operators. 
 
3. More local responsibility for climate change targets. A move to delegate responsibility for 
meeting climate change targets to local authorities possibly via local carbon reduction 
targets, would result in the need for much more active engagement with final customers 
and pressure for the emergence of innovative local solutions. 
 
4. New forms of energy asset ownership. The emergence of innovative forms of ownership of 
electricity assets such as via local public‐private partnerships or customer trusts (possibly 
facilitated by new types of energy company licenses), based on carve‐outs of local 
distribution assets and private wires, would reduce the need to regulate wholly‐privately 
owned network monopolies and mitigate the need to regulate long term contracts for locally 
produced electricity and heat services. 
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